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ABSTRACT
FAIRNESS & SOCIAL JUSTICE: DISTINCT MORALITIES
FEBRUARY 2016
PRERANA BHARADWAJ,
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
M.S., HUNTER COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Ronnie Janoff-Bulman
Individual deservingness and group-based equality as rules of distribution have routinely
been conflated in past research. These two studies are an attempt to further establish the
differences between these two as moral values named fairness and social justice,
respectively. In both studies, participants rated “moral acceptability” of eight real-world
scenarios that either upheld fairness and violated social justice or vice versa. Each of
these scenarios was presented at two time points: at time 1, the upheld principle was
presented and the violation of the other was implied, but at time 2, the violation was
made apparent with a second sentence. Individual preferences for fairness and social
justice were also measured. Study 1 primed basic principles of each value with a sentence
scramble task before participants responded to the scenarios. Priming social justice
principles significantly decreased moral acceptability ratings of fair scenarios before the
social injustice was made apparent compared to the control condition, but ultimately
individual differences in preferences for each principle were most predictive of moral
acceptability ratings of both types of scenarios. Study 2 primed individual and collective
perspectives with a writing prompt before participants responded to scenarios. Both
priming tasks increased moral acceptability ratings of socially just scenarios before the
unfairness was made apparent. This may have been due to the nature of the writing
prompts, both of which required the participant to think of others, suggesting that social
justice involves the consideration of social categories rather than simply a collection of
people. In both studies, priming tasks and individual differences were generally unable to
encourage recognition of the violation one or the other value, prompting the discussion of
what else might promote such effortful thinking.
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CHAPTER 1
FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE - THE CONFLICT
A. Introduction

In a recent The New York Times op ed, Rob Reich presents an argument against
parents donating large amounts of money to their child’s public school (Reich, 2013).
Reich discusses the case of Hillsborough, California, a wealthy town that encourages
donations to public schools of about $2,300 per student. At first glance, few readers can
find anything morally unacceptable about parents wanting to support their own child’s
education. However, Reich (2013) writes: “Private giving to public schools widens the
gap between rich and poor. It exacerbates inequalities in financing. It is philanthropy in
the service of conferring advantage on the already well off” (p. A25). Essentially, Reich
claims that allowing public school donations would improve some schools, but not others
– and this increased inequality is unacceptable. We believe that the conflict between these
two opinions of the same situation stems from two different but nevertheless valid moral
values: fairness and social justice.
Fundamentally, the debate concerns moral rules for allocation of resources in a
society. The method we propose as fairness uses input-based deservingness to allocate
resources. However, resources allotted according to individual merit can result in an
unfair distribution of such resources on the group level. Such a distribution would violate
values of social justice, which allots resources on the basis of group membership. For
instance, allocating funding to schools based on the individual incomes of students’
families would result in an unequal distribution of funding across schools situated in
high- and low-income communities. Allocating funding in accordance with social justice
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would pool money sources (e.g., property taxes, donations, etc.) across a city or state and
would divide the proceeds relatively equally across schools.
The proposed research aims to understand the psychological frameworks that
guide cognition and judgments of fairness and social justice principles. Distinguishing
between the two terms will allow us to understand their underlying features and provide
support for including social justice as a moral value separate from, but comparable to,
fairness in the moral psychology literature.
B. Fairness and Social Justice in Theory

The debate concerning differing rules of allocation of resources and what
constitutes a “just” society is not a new one, nor is it confined to psychology. In the early
1970s, John Rawls and Robert Nozick famously argued for different rules. Rawls (1971)
suggested a thought experiment in his now-classic book, A Theory of Justice. To develop
a just society, we should be under what he called a “veil of ignorance” in which we had
no prior knowledge of our abilities, education, wealth, or ethnicity. What kind of society
would we create then? He believed rational agents would create a society in which
everyone was guaranteed basic rights, including equality of opportunity. Furthermore,
equality of opportunity requires access to similar resources, so the society would also
have to be somewhat redistributive (in the direction of providing more resources to the
least advantaged), thereby ensuring a decent standard of living for everyone (Rawls,
1971).
In 1974, Nozick wrote Anarchy, State, and Utopia, in which he disagreed with
Rawls and presented an alternative view. Nozick argued that a truly just society is one
that results from a completely unfettered free market. If one person produces a good or
service that is in high demand and others voluntarily pay for it, this person has a right to
2

the money he earns. He gives the example of Wilt Chamberlain, the basketball player,
who earns money from the tickets for which his fans freely pay, which he has no
obligation to return in the form of taxes (Nozick, 1974).
For the most part, both sides of this debate seem to make comparable sense. How
is this possible? We propose that fairness and social justice represent two different but
nevertheless valid moral values that we can hold simultaneously. Conflict results when
the two values cannot coexist as rules for the allocation of resources in the same situation.
So how do fairness and social justice differ? We propose that the principles
involve two different ways of thinking about deservingness. More specifically, Fairness
involves input-based deservingness and results in outcomes based on proportionality. In
contrast, Social Justice involves deservingness based on common group membership and
results in outcomes that are relatively equal across the group. Fairness is based on an
individual or group’s specific effort, work, or contributions, whereas Social Justice is
based in communal sharing of the group’s resources - here a person is entitled to
distributions as a member of the group. Cognitively, Fairness requires the restricted,
vertical comparison of units that are seen as different within specific relationships,
whereas Social Justice requires the broader, horizontal comparison of similar groups
across a distribution.
Past work has been largely theoretical wherein political philosophers and
economists have argued over the distribution rules that are most effective in making
various decisions (also known as distributive justice). One prevalent model of distributive
justice is Equity Theory, which is motivated by a need to balance individual inputs and
the resulting outcomes (see, e.g., Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). We believe
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that Fairness relies on equity judgments, in that both are based in principles of
proportionality. Yet proportionality in distributing goods and services could conceivably
confer inappropriate advantage to members of groups with more resources in a formal
system, thus resulting in a skewed distribution of the resources on a larger scale. A
different principle, based in shared group membership-level concerns, would demand
redistribution to result in the relatively equal distribution of resources across such groups;
this reflects the principle of social justice.
Distinguishing between two rules of distributional justice, individual
deservingness and group-based equality, has been explored in the past more theoretically
than empirically. Sampson (1975) puts forth the concept of “justice as equality” and
suggests that “equality” and “equity” often conflict in the real world, but individual and
contextual differences may predict which is valued in any given situation. Cohen (1979)
expands on this distinction but makes a clear argument for the necessity of empirical
research as there are a number of confusing conceptual frameworks and terms that
encompass what he refers to as rules of distribution that either do or do not differentiate
between individuals by some level of input. Wenzel (2004) picks up this thread but
emphasizes the role of group membership in his chapter dedicated to a “social
categorization approach to distributive justice” wherein two empirical studies suggest that
identifying with a subgroup predicts greater preference for equality over self-interest.
The current research extends these earlier findings and theoretical arguments in
three ways. First, previous research has largely focused on the behavior of dyads (Cohen,
1979), while the current research uses real-world phenomena presented as scenarios
involving individuals and groups of people. Second, while individual deservingness and
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group-based equality may be useful academic distinctions, fairness and social justice are
supported here as concise terms that capture the descriptive and normative ways in which
people already think about these two principles – a valuable characteristic for social
psychologists. Third, the current research takes a step forward by attempting to
understand the relationships between the two principles within the individual.
The past work closest to our perspective on fairness versus social justice is a 1981
paper by Brickman and colleagues (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981), in which
they distinguish between microjustice and macrojustice. Microjustice requires and
involves individual recipients, whereas macrojustice involves the aggregate distribution
of rewards in society. This theoretical chapter explains that in various situations, treating
individuals in accordance with microjustice may produce what seems to be an unjust
distribution of rewards among groups. Moreover, Brickman and colleagues present
evidence demonstrating that although people may initially use microjustice to make
decisions, they are unhappy when this rule results in negatively skewed distributions
across groups (Brickman, et.al., 1981). From our perspective, fairness is akin to
Brickman et al’s (1981) microjustice, and social justice is akin to macrojustice. Equity
theory and microjustice, and equality and macrojustice, typically involve the behavior
and identity of individuals vs. groups, respectively, but there are situations where groups
exhibit input-based deservingness and the individual is a victim of inequality as a result
of group membership. Thus, fairness and social justice better and more completely
capture the difference between these two distribution rules.
C. Fairness & Social Justice in Moral Psychology

Current understanding of moral principles relies on the prevailing model of moral
values -- Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; e.g., Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, &
5

Ditto, 2011; Haidt, 2007, 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007). According to Haidt and
colleagues, there are five moral foundations: two “individualizing” foundations
(Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity) and three “binding” foundations (Ingroup/Loyalty,
Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity). The individualizing foundations emphasize the
individual as the focus of concern and involve contractual approaches to morality. In
contrast, the binding foundations emphasize the group as the focus of concern and
function to bind people together.
Although present in MFT, Fairness is ill-defined and the foundation seems to
confound different definitions. A brief look at the six MFT items for Fairness makes this
apparent. The six items are: “Whether or not some people were treated differently than
others” (item 2); “Whether or not someone acted unfairly” (item 8); “Whether or not
someone was denied his or her rights” (item 13); “When the government makes laws, the
number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly” (item 18);
“Justice is the most important requirement for a society” (item 24), and “I think it’s
morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit
nothing” (item 29). On 6-point scales, participants indicate the relevance of items 2, 8,
and 13 to their own thinking and the extent of their agreement with items 18, 24, and 29.
Participants are left to define fairness for themselves - the word justice is even used in
place of fairness in one of the items.
Interestingly, in linking morality to political ideology, Haidt and colleagues
(Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2007, 2012; Haidt &
Graham, 2007) conclude that liberals emphasize the individualizing foundations, whereas
conservatives rely on all five foundations, both the individualizing and binding
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foundations. The provocative implication of their claims is that liberals don’t have a
morality that is focused on the group; that is, only conservatives have a group-based
morality. Moreover, in his recent book, Haidt (2012) returns to the Fairness foundation
and writes, “Everyone cares about fairness, but there are two major kinds. On the
[political] left, fairness often implies equality, but on the [political] right it means
proportionality—people should be rewarded in proportion to what they contribute, even if
that guarantees unequal outcomes” (p. 138).
We will argue otherwise: everyone does value Fairness, but fairness has a
particular and similar meaning across the political spectrum (largely a concept focused on
individual input and proportionality). However, the equality of the political left Haidt
refers to actually reflects concerns about Social Justice, a group-based morality missing
from the MFT.
A new model of morality addresses this omission and Haidt and colleagues’ claim
that there is no liberal group-based morality (i.e., the three binding moralities in MFT are
endorsed by conservatives and not liberals). More specifically, in their Model of Moral
Motives (MMM) Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) derived distinct moral principles by
turning to a fundamental motivational distinction, approach versus avoidance, and
crossing these orientations with three foci of moral concern: the self (intrapersonal), the
other (interpersonal), and the group (collective). Approach-based morality, or prescriptive
morality, emphasizes positive, selfless behaviors, whereas avoidance-based morality, or
proscriptive morality, is restrictive and involves restraining negative, self-interested
behaviors (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). A key extension of moral principles
in the MMM involves the group-focused, or binding, moralities. MMM includes both an
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approach-based and an avoidance-based binding morality, specifically Social Justice and
Social Order, respectively.
Social Order emphasizes conformity and strict adherence to behavioral norms. It
is responsive to threats and dangers to the group, be they threats to physical safety or
psychological identity. Social Order serves collective coordination; self-interest and selfexpression are constrained in the service of the larger group’s interests.
In contrast, Social Justice involves efforts to advance the group’s welfare, with a
particular emphasis on equality-based distributional outcomes. It promotes collective
cooperation rather than coordination. A Social Justice morality is oriented towards
providing for the group, whereas a Social Order morality is oriented towards protecting
the group (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; also see Janoff-Bulman, 2009).
Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) claim that the three binding moralities of
MFT are all mechanisms that serve Social Order, and empirical research supports this
claim (see, e.g., Carnes, Lickel, and Janoff-Bulman, 2014). MFT includes only
proscriptive group moralities and omits a prescriptive morality, and thus it is small
wonder that based on the MFT moral foundations, only political conservatives endorse a
binding morality. When including Social Justice, however, both political liberals and
conservatives have a binding morality (see, e.g., Carnes et al., 2014; Janoff-Bulman &
Carnes, 2014). The proposed studies will further buttress Social Justice as a distinct and
important moral value.
D. Past Empirical Work on Fairness and Social Justice.

Brickman et al. (1981) have inspired a number of studies attempting to understand
individual preference for micro or macrojustice and its effect on attitudes and decisions.
These studies each reinforce general qualities we are categorizing as fairness or social
8

justice. Murphy-Berman and colleagues (Murphy-Berman, Cukur & Berman, 2002)
asked Turkish and US respondents to allocate resources to individuals and groups in two
conditions: microjustice and macrojustice situations. Subjects used microjustice rules to
allocate resources to individuals but macrojustice rules to allocate resources to groups (.
Another study, using a mood induction, found that elated participants were more likely to
use macrojustice rules, whereas depressed participants were more likely to use
microjustice rules (Sinclair & Mark, 1991). In 2007, researchers took the question to realworld phenomena. Lillie and colleagues found that participants in the microjustice
condition perceived the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as less
acceptable than those in the macrojustice condition (Lillie & Janoff-Bulman, 2007). A
1998 study found that, overall, macrojustice arguments were more successful for proenvironmentalist decisions while microjustice arguments were more successful for antienvironmentalist decisions (Clayton, 1998).
Although the microjustice-macrojustice model and subsequent studies speak to
some important differences, the model is incomplete and the defining features of past
work on macrojustice and microjustice seem to be whether they refer to an individual’s
outcome or a group’s outcome. Another study by Jost and colleagues provides evidence
suggesting that intergroup allocation decisions can reflect both proportionality and
equality between groups (Jost & Azzi, 1996). This provides motivation to consider
fairness and social justice at both the individual and group levels. After all, societal
groups can be considered both collections of individuals and subsets of larger society,
and a single person can be a unique individual or a group member.
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Several studies have also used different measures of self construals to grasp how
people are thinking about individual deservingness and group membership-based
equality. In an exploratory 2007 study on self-construal styles, results showed that
manipulating an interdependent self-construal induced stronger reactions to injustice and
moral concerns (Gollwitzer, M., & Bucklein, K., 2007).
However, like most studies eliciting reactions to “injustice” or “moral concerns,”
the scenarios in this study confounded violations of input-based deservingness with
violations of group membership-based equality. Connecting self-construal and
micro/macrojustice, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011) assessed participants’ independent selfconstruals and found that high scores were associated with lower endorsement of
macrojustice and lower support for Affirmative Action. We interpret Affirmative Action
as a prime example of when the values of fairness and social justice come into conflict.
On the one hand, colleges aim to recruit students who display exceptional academic
merit. However, admissions policies also take into account other considerations such as
past hardship, extraneous circumstances, and, most importantly, group membership.
Making admissions decisions on individual deservingness and merit alone would result in
a negatively skewed distribution of admissions concentrated in groups with access to
more resources. Thus interpreted from our perspective, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011)
found that people who defined themselves in terms of their independence from others
were less likely to use what we would consider a social justice lens and instead relied on
a fairness lens when considering Affirmative Action.
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CHAPTER 2
MY PRIOR PRELIMINARY RESEARCH

While we may have imposed the words fairness and social justice onto two sets of
principles, there are parallels in everyday language. In a previous exploratory study, we
asked 70 college students to give us examples of fairness and unfairness or social justice
and social injustice. Each of their open-ended responses was coded by independent
coders for key words that described individuals/groups, ascribed membership/actions,
and discrete examples/global phenomena, among others. When asked about fairness and
unfairness, participants used more words involving a collection of unrelated people,
reciprocity, proportionality, and discrete events, but when asked about social justice and
social injustice, they used more words about people in social categories, instances of
discrimination or prejudice, ongoing phenomena, and group membership. Therefore,
although the terms were imposed on two sets of qualities, we concluded that they are in
fact comparable to the connotations of fairness and social justice in everyday language.
A second exploratory study aimed to demonstrate that participants can hold
equally valid opinions of fairness and social justice at the same time. Previous work has
attempted to use individual differences in sensitivity to social justice to predict decisions.
Specifically, endorsement of social justice tends to be associated with liberalism and
identification with the Democratic Party (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008).
Fairness, however, may be a universal value that is the default method of evaluation. For
this study, 202 participants recruited online were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions, and each took three surveys. In the first condition, participants took a measure
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of fairness, a filler measure (BIS/BAS), and a measure of social justice. In the second
condition, the order was reversed.
The five-item Fairness Scale was adapted from the Preference for the Merit
Principle Scale (Davey, L., Bobocel, DR., Hing, L., Zanna, M., 1999). Five items that
specifically endorsed rules for rewarding individual contribution were chosen from the
PMP to create the Fairness Scale. The statements were rewritten to reflect groups in
society and vague rewards, rather than the original words that specified pay in a
workplace environment. Examples of statements in the Fairness Scale include: “In
society, people who do a good job ought to rise to the top” and “The effort a person puts
into something ought to be reflected in the size of the reward he or she receives” [see
Appendix C for full scale]. Participants also completed the five-item Social Justice scale
from the Model of Moral Motives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013, 2014). Examples of
statements in the Social Justice Scale include “In the healthiest societies, those at the top
should feel responsible for improving the wellbeing of those at the bottom” and “It is our
responsibility, not just a matter of personal preference, to provide for groups worse off in
society” [see Appendix D for full scale]. A filler task was included between the measures
of Fairness and Social Justice: participants completed 14 items from the Carver and
White’s (1994) Behavioral Inhibition/Activation Scale.
We found no order effects; that is, Fairness did not differ based on whether it was
administered first or last; nor did Social Justice differ based on order. As predicted,
Fairness and Social Justice represented unique principles, for across both time points,
Fairness and Social Justice scores were uncorrelated. The extent to which participants
endorsed one was unrelated to their endorsement of the other. Also, Fairness was not
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associated with political orientation, but Social Justice was negatively correlated with
Political Orientation; that is, conservatism was associated with lower Social Justice
scores. Thus, support of Social Justice principles appears to be politically aligned, but
Fairness principles may have more universal appeal, as they are unrelated to political
positions. Essentially, each scale, Fairness and Social Justice, seems to tap independent
distributional principles, which are not mutually exclusive.
Finally, construal level was explored in a third study where an abstract or concrete
construal level was first primed, and then endorsement of either Fairness or Social Justice
values was measured. Because we believe Fairness involves a restricted perspective of
specific units of exchange, we predicted that this would be connected to a concrete
cognitive framework focused on details, rather than the big picture. Conversely, because
Social Justice involves an inclusive, horizontal comparison across groups, we predicted
that this broader perspective would be connected to an abstract cognitive framework. The
study asked 322 online respondents to complete a Construal Level priming task drawn
from Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi (2006). In this task, the instructions to the
participant determine whether the task primed a concrete construal or an abstract
construal level. The “abstract” directions are to list the larger categories that define each
of 20 distinct items. The “concrete” directions are to list specific examples of the same 20
items. The control condition did not involve any priming task. Participants also either
completed the Fairness scale or Social Justice scale utilized earlier. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of six conditions crossing abstract, concrete, and no-prime
construals with completion of the Fairness and Social Justice scales. Responses on the
Fairness scale were unchanged by condition (i.e.., abstract, concrete, and no-prime
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control), but there was a significant difference in Social Justice scores by prime The
concrete and control conditions did not differ, but both differed significantly from the
abstract prime condition. Inducing an abstract state of mind resulted in higher
endorsement of Social Justice, compared with both concrete and no prime conditions,
suggesting that Social Justice involves a style of processing that promotes thinking about
the “big picture.”
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY PURPOSE & MATERIALS
A. Purpose

Our earlier studies were largely exploratory and served as a first step to
establishing what we refer to as fairness and social justice as two distinct moral methods
of allocating resources, which can often come into conflict with each other. However, no
other studies thus far have explored the use of a fairness or social justice lens in
evaluating real-world situations in a variety of domains that can be seen from both
angles. In addition, although some studies have attempted to influence sensitivity to
moral values by manipulating perspective, stimuli have largely confounded individual
deservingness and equality based on group membership. Lastly, while some aspects of
both reciprocity and equality may be partially represented in the morality literature as
“fairness” in the Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2007), these concepts are confounded
and social justice as a moral value is conspicuously missing.
Moving forward, the following two studies aimed to understand how different
psychological frameworks can affect moral judgments of fairness and social justice. We
were particularly interested in how people make moral judgments when the two
principles are in conflict. The first study explored whether priming each principle affects
moral judgments. We hypothesized that priming a fairness lens would increase sensitivity
to input-based deservingness that isn’t specifically mentioned in the scenarios, whereas
priming a social justice lens would increase sensitivity to group membership-based
allocations of resources and the resulting equal or skewed distributions. The second study
explored whether focusing either on the individual (via a person’s unique identity) or the
group (via common group identity) affects moral judgments of the same situations used
15

in Study 1. We hypothesized that focusing on a unique individual identity would increase
sensitivity to input-based deservingness that isn’t specifically mentioned in the scenarios,
whereas focusing on a collective social identity would increase sensitivity to group
membership-based allocations of resources and the resulting equal or skewed
distributions. Both of the studies were designed to shed light on how different mental
models can affect sensitivity to, and endorsement of, fairness and social justice
principles. These studies aimed to provide support for including social justice as a moral
value that is comparable to, but distinct from, fairness in the moral psychology literature
and to better understand when we rely on each principle in instances when they conflict.
B. Materials: Scenarios

Both studies used moral acceptability ratings (from 1 to 7, 1 = “not at all
acceptable” and 7 = “very acceptable”) of hypothetical scenarios as the dependent
variable. Each of the 16 scenarios pitted fairness and social justice values against each
other such that they showcased instances where input-based deservingness rules create a
skewed distribution across groups (8 scenarios), or instances where rules that support
group membership-based equality violate individual deservingness (8 scenarios). All of
the scenarios were inspired by Rob Reich’s example of the drawbacks of a seemingly
moral act (parents donating to their child’s public school). Each of the scenarios was
composed of two parts, hereby referred to as Time 1 and Time 2. At Time 1, participants
only read enough information to identify the situation, which on its face is either fair (8
scenarios) or socially just (8 scenarios). At this point, participants may or may not
recognize the moral value being violated (fairness or social justice). At Time 2, additional
information is presented that explicitly violates the moral principle presented at Time 1,
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but supports the other principle. Here, the conflict between the two moral values is
evident. Moral acceptability of the scenarios is rated at both Time 1 and Time 2.
An example of a “Fair but Unjust” scenario at Time 1 was:
“In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal
of money to their children’s public school.”

An example of a “Fair but Unjust” scenario at Time 2 was:
“In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal
of money to their children’s public school.
Other public schools in the city with lower income families
get no additional funds from parents.”

An example of a “Just but Unfair” scenario at Time 1 was:
“Students at a major university are admitted based on a
combination of factors, including academic achievement,
past hardship, and group membership.”

An example of a “Just but Unfair” scenario at Time 2 was:
Students at a major university are admitted based on a
combination of factors, including academic achievement,
past hardship, and group membership.
Some students with better academic records are not admitted to the university.”
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[See Appendix A for a list of all scenarios]
There were therefore eight Time 1 scenarios that were Fair but Unjust
(Cronbach’s α = .695) and eight Time 2 scenarios that provided the additional justice
violation for the Fair but Unjust scenarios (α = .898). Similarly, there were eight Just but
Unfair scenarios at Time 1 (α = .903), and eight at Time 2 when the additional fairness
violation was added to these scenarios (α = .906).
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 1
A. Methods of Study 1

The purpose of the first study was to determine whether priming principles of
fairness and social justice can be used to influence moral judgments of scenarios in which
fairness and social justice are in conflict. We were particularly interested in whether
participants primed with a particular principle (e.g., social justice) would recognize
violations of that principle when it was not mentioned in the scenario (e.g., recognizing
that donating to your child’s public school violates social justice principles) or would be
less likely to recognize it when primed with a consistent principle (i.e., fairness).
i.

Materials

The independent variable was operationalized as a priming task that instructed
participants to unscramble (i.e., place in order) several words within six sentences that
either endorsed fairness or social justice values (four sentences), or were filler items (two
sentences). For example, participants may have seen the following sentence where the
words “the economic equality” are scrambled:
“The healthier the society, the greater [equality economic the].”
[See Appendix B for all items]
Control conditions completed no scrambling task. The dependent variable was
operationalized as a mean moral acceptability rating (from 1 to 7, 1 = “not at all
acceptable” and 7 = “very acceptable”) at Time 1 and Time 2 of each of the eight
developed scenarios.
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ii.

Hypotheses

Condition as indicated by the priming task was a between-subjects variable and
time was a within-subjects variable. Therefore, we first hypothesized a main effect of
time such that mean moral acceptability ratings of scenarios across conditions would
decrease from Time 1 when the conflict was presented at Time 2.
Second, we hypothesized an interaction of condition by time within type of
scenario. Essentially, we predicted that participants primed with Social Justice would rate
scenarios where fairness was upheld but social justice was violated (Fair but Unjust) as
less acceptable as compared to individuals primed with Fairness or in the control
condition for those scenarios. Similarly, we predicted that participants primed with
Fairness would rate scenarios where social justice was upheld but fairness was violated
(Just but Unfair) as less acceptable compared to individuals primed with Social Justice or
in the control condition for those scenarios. However, the interaction with time was
predicted such that the difference in mean moral acceptability ratings within scenario
type between conditions would be significant at Time 1 before the conflict was made
apparent, but ratings at Time 2 would not differ between conditions; rather they would be
equally low across conditions.
Furthermore, in addition to these main analyses, moderation by individual
differences in endorsement of Fairness and Social Justice was explored. Participants’
Fairness and Social Justice scores from the scales they completed at the end of the
procedure may serve as possible explanations for why certain subjects may already have
been sensitive to each value above and beyond the prime. Specifically, we hypothesized a
scale by time interaction (hypothesis 3) such that participants high on Fairness would
react negatively to Socially Just but Unfair scenarios, presumably initially recognizing
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the unfairness as they are sensitive to it, and rate them as less acceptable at Time 1, but at
Time 2 they would rate them as low as people low on Fairness. Similarly, we predicted
that participants high on Social Justice would react negatively to Fair but Socially Unjust
scenarios, presumably recognizing the injustice, and rate them as less acceptable at Time
1 compared to people low on Social Justice. Moreover, we hypothesized a scale by time
by condition three-way interaction (hypothesis 4) such that where scales and conditions
are consonant (e.g. Fairness prime and high endorsement of Fairness or Social Justice
prime and high endorsement of Social Justice) mean moral acceptability ratings of
scenarios that uphold the same consonant value would be increased at Time 1, as the
prime may particularly activate sensitivity to the consonant principle.
iii.

Participants

Participants were recruited online from a diverse and inclusive population. A total
of 357 participants were assigned to one of six conditions. Although 455 participants
originally completed the study, participants were excluded if they refused to give consent
or did not complete the priming task, incorrectly answered the attention check question
(marked a different option for a question instructing participants to mark “Option 4”),
took 1 standard deviation less than the mean time to complete the study, or took two
standard deviations more than the mean time to complete the study. There were also three
outliers on the political identity scale who indicated a conservative political identity but
also a contradictory strong belief in social justice; a closer look showed that these
respondents had entered the same number as a response for all questions and were thus
removed from the sample for not completing the study conscientiously. Informed consent
was obtained for all of the included participants and they received monetary
compensation for their participation.
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Participants ranged from age 19 to age 70 (M = 37.53, SD = 11.60). Fifty-two
percent of the participants were female, and 48% were male. The sample was 79% White,
7% Black, 4% Hispanic, 5% Asian, and 5% reported “Other.”
iv.

Procedure

Each participant was randomly assigned to one of six conditions (3 x 2) where
priming task (fairness, social justice, and control) was crossed with which value was
upheld in the Time 1 scenarios (fairness but not social justice, or social justice but not
fairness). Participants were not given a mixed set of all 16 scenarios due to contamination
of concepts – participants would be sensitive to both values upheld equally in the
combined set of scenarios. Each participant first completed one of the three priming
tasks. Then, participants read all 8 assigned scenarios and rated their “‘moral
acceptability” based on the Time 1 information given. They were then given the same
scenarios with both parts included (Time 2) and again rated their “moral acceptability.”
Participants also completed the 5-item Fairness Scale and 5-item Social Justice Scale.
Lastly, participants completed a short demographic survey [see Appendix E for complete
survey].
B. Results of Study 1

A preliminary scan of the data revealed that most of the outcome variables were
normally distributed with no outliers that were greatly affecting the mean. However, one
variable, mean moral acceptability ratings of just but unfair scenarios at Time 1,
displayed a negatively skewed distribution (skewness = -1.61, SE = .18; Shapiro-Wilke =
.85, p < .001). When a square root transformation was applied to induce a normal
distribution, neither the skewness nor the results of the analyses changed and, therefore,
the transformation was not maintained.
22

i.

Individual Differences

In terms of self-reported values and beliefs, participants indicated high agreement
with the 7-point Fairness scale (M = 5.61, SD = .97) and high agreement with the 7-point
Social Justice scale, although with greater variability in scores (M = 5.22, SD = 1.40).
Overall, however, Fairness and Social Justice scores as individual differences were not
correlated with each other, r(357) = -.071, p > .1, and did not differ by condition
(Fairness F(5,351) = 1.45, p = .21; Social Justice F(2,176) = 1.27, p = .28)
Fairness scores were moderately positively correlated with mean moral
acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1, r(179) = .286, p < .001, and
at Time 2, r(179) = .283, p <.001. Social Justice scores were negatively correlated with
mean moral acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1, r(179) = -.254, p
< .001, at Time 2, r(179) = -.536, p < .001, and with the difference between time points,
r(179) = -.489, p < .001 (see Table 1).
Fairness scores were moderately negatively correlated with mean moral
acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios at Time 2, r(178) = -.383, p < .001, and
with the difference in scores between Time 1 and Time 2, r(178) = -.360, p <.001. Social
Justice scores were positively correlated with mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but
Unfair scenarios at Time 1, r(178) = .563, p < .001, and at Time 2, r(178) = .464, p < .001
(see Table 2).
These correlations provided the basis for exploration of individual difference
measures of Fairness and Social Justice in accounting for the differences in mean moral
acceptability ratings between time points and conditions.
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ii.

Hierarchical Linear Model

A hierarchical linear model was used to analyze a data structure where time points
(level-1) were nested within participants (level-2) randomly assigned to conditions. The
dependent variable was participants’ mean moral acceptability ratings of eight scenarios
(either Fair but Unjust or Just but Unfair). Model testing involved five steps that
successively added more predictors, all with intercepts- and slopes-as-outcomes as
variance existed at both levels; error variance from the individual scenarios was fixed
using 1 – reliability (Cronbach’s α) multiplied by the variance of the set of scenarios at
each time points. The final model included time, condition, Fairness scale score, Social
Justice scale score, and their interactions as factors predicting mean moral acceptability
ratings of scenarios. Scenario type, however, was randomly assigned and because there is
no shared variance between participants assigned to either Fair but Unjust or Just but
Unfair scenarios, this particular design does not allow for hierarchical linear modeling
analysis comparing responses to one set of scenarios vs. the other.
For Fair but Unjust scenarios, the regression coefficient representing the main
effect of time was significant and negative (b = -1.30, p < .001) indicating that mean
moral acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios decreased significantly across
conditions from Time 1 to Time 2 (Time 1 M = 5.52, SD = .81; Time 2 M = 4.17, SD =
1.32, see Figure 1). Second, there was a significant main effect of condition such that the
Social Justice prime condition reduced Time 1 ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios as
compared to the Control condition (b = -.43, p = .001), but this effect was not maintained
at Time 2 (b = -.00, p = .964). The main effect of the Fair prime condition was marginal
at Time 1 (b = -.26, p = .053), and non-significant at Time 2 (b = -.09, p = .560) as
compared to the Control condition (see Figure 2). Third, individual differences as
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measured by the Fairness and Social Justice scales proved influential at different time
points, indicating a scale by time interaction. The regression coefficient representing the
effect of an individual preference for Fairness was positive and significant at Time 1 (b =
.20, p = .021, see Figure 3), and positive and significant at Time 2 (b = .27, p = .013, see
Figure 4) suggesting that higher scores on the Fairness scale predicted higher mean moral
acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios at both time points. The regression
coefficient representing the effect of an individual preference for Social Justice was
negative and significant only at Time 2 (b = -.35, p < .001, see Figure 5) suggesting that
higher scores on the Social Justice scale predicted lower mean moral acceptability ratings
only when the injustice was made apparent. Last, there was one significant three-way
interaction whereby the regression coefficient representing the slope or decrease in
ratings from Time 1 to Time 2 was further reduced for participants with higher individual
preferences for Fairness who were assigned to the Social Justice prime (b = -.42, p =
.009, see Figure 6). To ascertain whether this interaction was being driven by high or low
scores on the Fairness scale, two separate models were run with one model using the
Fairness scales centered one standard deviation below the mean and the other centered
one standard deviation above the mean. The effect of the Social Justice prime condition
was only significant at Time 2 when the model was centered to reflect high (b = .41, p =
.043) but not low (b = -.42, p = .093) values on the Fairness scale indicating an
acceptance of the Social Justice prime when responding to social injustice, especially for
those high on Fairness. See Table 3 for regression coefficients.
For Just but Unfair scenarios, the regression coefficient representing the main
effect of time was significant and negative (b = -2.08, p < .001) indicating that mean
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moral acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios decreased significantly across
conditions from Time 1 to Time 2 (Time 1 M = 5.93, SD = 1.06; Time 2 M = 3.72, SD =
1.32, see Figure 7). Second, the main effect of condition is not significant (see Figure 8).
Third, an individual difference as measured by the Social Justice scale proved influential
at different time points, indicating a scale by time interaction. The regression coefficient
representing the effect of an individual preference for Social Justice was positive and
significant at Time 1 (b = .51, p < .001) suggesting that higher scores on the Social
Justice scale predicted higher mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair
scenarios before the unfairness was made apparent (see Figure 9). Last, there was the
same significant three-way interaction between scale, time, and condition whereby the
decrease in ratings from Time 1 to Time 2 was further reduced for participants with
higher individual preferences for Fairness who were assigned to the Social Justice prime
(b = -.63, p = .015, see Figure 10). Again to ascertain whether this interaction was being
driven by high or low scores on the Fairness scale, two separate models were run with
one model using the Fairness scales centered one standard deviation below the mean and
the other centered one standard deviation above the mean. The effect of the Social Justice
prime condition was only significant at Time 2 when the model was centered to reflect
high (b = -.76, p = .028) but not low (b = .45, p = .132) values on the Fairness scale
indicating a negative reactance to the Social Justice prime when responding to unfairness,
especially for those high on Fairness. See Table 4 for regression coefficients.
C. Discussion of Study 1

First, the hypothesized effect of time on mean moral acceptability ratings was
borne out for both sets of scenarios such that illumination of the conflict between the two
values represented in each scenario at Time 2 resulted in lower moral acceptability across
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conditions as compared to Time 1. The effect size for this was found to exceed
convention for a medium effect (η2 = .5), η2 = .63 for Fair but Unjust scenarios, and η2 =
.75 for Just but Unfair scenarios. Essentially, the negative consequences of upholding one
(but violating the other) moral value between fairness and social justice were evaluated as
less morally acceptable, regardless of primed conditions and individual differences in
endorsement of fairness and social justice.
Second, while the Fairness priming task had little to no effect on evaluations of
scenarios, the Social Justice prime did have an effect but came into play at difference
time points for each set of scenarios. Why might the scenario ratings in the Fairness
prime condition and control condition look largely similar? One hypothesis that requires
experimental confirmation is that fairness is a cognitive default perspective and using a
social justice lens requires additional cognition. For Fair but Unjust scenarios, across time
points, participants who were primed with social justice (the conflicting value), however,
evaluated Fair but Unjust scenarios as less acceptable, compared to participants who were
not primed with any value or with the consistent value of fairness. This finding supports
the second hypothesis that priming participants with social justice principles can increase
their sensitivity to violations of social justice in the fair but unjust scenarios before the
conflict was made apparent at Time 2. For Just but Unfair scenarios, however, priming
fairness principles did not have an effect on moral acceptability ratings of scenarios, so
the condition by time interaction was not borne out for these scenarios. This may in part
be due to the strong effects of individual preferences for each principle.
Specifically, individual differences played a role in evaluations of both sets of
scenarios as participants who were high on one scale evaluated value-consistent scenarios

27

as more morally acceptable at Time 1; the higher the participants were on the Fairness
scale, the more morally acceptable they rated Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1 and the
higher the participants were on the Social Justice scale, the more morally acceptable they
rated Just but Unfair scenarios at Time 1. This is counter to the characteristics of the scale
by time interaction predicted earlier; sensitivity to a principle did not encourage
sensitivity to its violation, rather it only encouraged further endorsement of the scenarios
that upheld it. Moreover, at Time 2 when the conflict was made apparent, evaluation of
the Fair but Unjust scenarios was still consistent with individual differences in preference
for Fairness. Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 2 were rated as increasingly morally
acceptable as participants’ endorsement of Fairness increased and separately rated as less
morally acceptable as participants’ endorsement of Social Justice decreased. Essentially,
while the priming task was somewhat effective, it was not as effective as individual
differences in endorsement of one or the other value at driving judgments of moral
acceptability of the conflict between two values in a given scenario.
At Time 2, the condition by time by scale interaction is significant for both types
of scenarios, but the interpretation differs. For Fair but Unjust scenarios, participants high
on fairness who were assigned to the Social Justice prime condition rated the violation of
social justice as uniformly unacceptable, while participants primed with Fairness or in the
control condition reported greater acceptability of the violation of social justice while
upholding fairness as their individual preference for fairness increased. This suggests an
acceptance of the Social Justice prime once the violation of social justice was made
apparent, specifically for participants with high Fairness scores. For Just but Unfair
scenarios, however, participants primed with the Social Justice prime rated the violation
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of fairness at Time 2 as less acceptable as their preference for Fairness increased – and
this relationship was stronger than for participants primed with Fairness or in the control
condition. The latter finding seems to reflect a reactance effect—that is, participants
seemed to react against the Social Justice prime. This difference in interpretation of the
same three-way interaction suggests that the two sets of scenarios, Fair but Unjust and
Just but Unfair, may be qualitatively different; although the current study design does not
allow for analyses that compare responses to both sets of scenarios to confirm this.
At Time 1, however, participants’ endorsement of the conflicting value was still
not predictive of their scenario ratings. That is, participants who were higher on Social
Justice did not rate the Fair but Unjust scenarios any differently and participants higher
on Fairness did not rate the Just but Unfair scenarios any differently. Essentially, the
majority of participants did not recognize the negative consequences of upholding
fairness and violating social justice, or vice versa, at Time 1. They were, however, largely
averse to them when they were made apparent at Time 2. Therefore, if not a priming of
the actual principles, an exploration of what will motivate this recognition is warranted.
Ultimately, differing reactions to Fair but Unjust and Just but Unfair scenarios at
Time 1 and Time 2 depending on individual differences and prime condition lend
credence to conceptualizing fairness and social justice as separate moral values that are
considered differently in different contexts, but similarly weighted nonetheless.
However, a greater understanding of the different scenario-based responses to the social
justice prime for those high on fairness requires further investigation.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 2
A. Methods of Study 2
The second study attempted to understand whether focus on a unique individual
identity or a collective identity involving common group membership would influence
endorsement of fairness or social justice.
i.

Materials

The independent variable was a priming task wherein participants responded to a
writing prompt that was designed to focus thoughts on the individual vs. a collective
identity, or neither (i.e., control condition). In the individual condition, participants wrote
about the qualities that make them unique as individuals, while the group condition
instructed participants to write about things they have in common with close others. More
specifically, the priming task was a version of the Similarities and Differences from
Families and Friends (SDFF) task adapted from Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto (1991).
The manipulation has been previously found to be successful at priming individualism
and collectivism (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Instructions to the participants read, "In the
space provided, write several sentences about what you have in common with all of your
friends and family” (collective) or “In the space provided, write several sentences about
what makes you unique from your friends and family” (individual). The latter establishes
a unique personal identity by emphasizing how the participant is distinct from close
others, whereas the former instruction emphasizes group-based commonalities and thus
shared group membership. The control condition did not involve a priming task. The
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dependent variable was moral acceptability ratings of the same scenarios used in Study 1
[see Appendix A].
ii.

Hypotheses

Condition as indicated by the priming task was a between-subjects variable and
time was a within-subjects variable. Therefore, we first hypothesized a main effect of
time such that mean moral acceptability ratings of scenarios across conditions would
decrease from Time 1 when the conflict was presented at Time 2 just as in Study 1.
Second, we hypothesized an interaction of condition by time within type of
scenario. Essentially, we predicted that participants focused on the collective group
would rate scenarios where fairness was upheld but social justice was violated (Fair but
Unjust) as less acceptable as compared to individuals primed with the individual or in the
control condition for those scenarios. Similarly, we predicted that participants primed
with focusing on the individual would rate scenarios where social justice was upheld but
fairness was violated (Just but Unfair) as less acceptable compared to individuals primed
with the collective or in the control condition for those scenarios. However, the
interaction with time was predicted such that the difference in mean moral acceptability
ratings within scenario type between conditions would be significant at Time 1 before the
conflict was made apparent, but ratings at Time 2 would not differ between conditions;
rather they would be equally low across conditions.
Furthermore, in addition to these main analyses, moderation by individual
differences in endorsement of Fairness and Social Justice was explored. Participants’
Fairness and Social Justice scores from the scales they completed at the end of the
procedure may serve again as possible explanations for why certain subjects may already
have been sensitive to each value above and beyond the prime. Specifically, we
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hypothesized a scale by time interaction (hypothesis 3) such that participants high on
Fairness would react negatively to Socially Just but Unfair scenarios, presumably initially
recognizing the unfairness as they are sensitive to it, and rate them as less acceptable at
Time 1, but at Time 2 they would rate them as low as people low on Fairness. Similarly,
we predicted that participants high on Social Justice would react negatively to Fair but
Socially Unjust scenarios, presumably recognizing the injustice, and rate them as less
acceptable at Time 1 compared to people low on Social Justice. Moreover, we
hypothesized a scale by time by condition three-way interaction (hypothesis 4) such that
where scales and conditions are consonant (e.g. individual prime and high endorsement
of Fairness or group prime and high endorsement of Social Justice) mean moral
acceptability ratings of scenarios that uphold the same consonant value would be
increased mean at Time 1, as the prime may particularly activate sensitivity to the
consonant principle.
iii.

Participants

Participants were recruited online from a diverse and inclusive population. A total
of 326 participants were assigned to one of six conditions. Although 461 participants
originally completed the study, participants were excluded if they refused to give consent
or did not complete the priming task, incorrectly answered the attention check question
(marked a different option for a question instructing participants to mark “Option 4”),
took 1 standard deviation less than the mean time to complete the study, or took two
standard deviations more than the mean time to complete the study. There were only two
outliers on the political identity scale who indicated a conservative political identity but
also a contradictory strong belief in social justice; a closer look showed that these
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respondents had entered the same number as a response for all questions and were thus
removed from the sample for not completing the study conscientiously. Informed consent
was obtained for all of the included participants and they received monetary
compensation for their participation.
Participants ranged from age 18 to age 74 (M = 35.70, SD = 11.43). Fifty-seven
percent of the participants were female, and 43% were male. The sample was 76.4%
White, 5.5% Black, 7.1% Hispanic, 5.5% Asian, and 5.5% reported ‘Other’.
iv.

Procedure

Each participant was randomly assigned to one of six conditions (3 x 2) where
priming task (individual, collective, or control) was crossed with which value was upheld
in the Time 1 scenarios (fairness but not social justice, or social justice but not fairness).
Again, participants were not given a mixed set of all 16 scenarios due to contamination of
concepts – participants would be sensitive to both values upheld equally in the combined
set of scenarios. Each participant first responded to one of the two writing prompts or did
not complete a prime (control condition). Then, participants read the 8 assigned scenarios
and rated their moral acceptability given the Time 1 information (Fair but Unjust
Scenarios at Time 1 Cronbach’s α = .745; Just but Unfair scenarios at Time 1 α = .853).
They then read the scenarios with the Time 2 information provided and once again rated
their moral acceptability (Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 2 α = .907; Just but Unfair
scenarios at Time 2 α = .904). Participants then completed the Fairness and Social Justice
Scales. Lastly, participants completed a short demographic survey [see Appendix E for
complete survey].
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B. Results of Study 2
A preliminary scan of the data revealed that all of the outcome variables were
normally distributed and most had no outliers that were greatly affecting the mean.
i.

Individual Differences

In terms of self-reported values and beliefs, participants indicated high agreement
with the 7-point Fairness scale (M = 5.59, SD = .98) and high agreement with the 7-point
Social Justice scale, although with greater variability in scores (M = 5.20, SD = 1.49).
Overall, Fairness and Social Justice scores were also negatively correlated with each
other, r(326) = -.172, p < .05, but did not differ by condition, Fairness F(5,320, = .94), p
= .46 and Social Justice F(5, 320) = .91, p = .48.
Fairness scores were moderately positively correlated with mean moral
acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1, r(167) = .282, p < .001, and
at Time 2, r(167) = .179, p <.05, but not with the difference between Time 1 and Time 2
(r(167) = .110, p > .5). Social Justice scores were negatively correlated with mean moral
acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1, r(167) = -.281, p < .001, at
Time 2, r(167) = -.660, p < .001, and with the difference between time points, r(167) = .602, p < .001 (see Table 5).
Fairness scores were moderately negatively correlated with mean moral
acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios at Time 2, r(159) = -.261, p = .001, and
with the difference in scores between Time 1 and Time 2, r(159) = -.272, p =.001. Social
Justice scores were positively correlated with mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but
Unfair scenarios at Time 1, r(159) = .630, p < .001, and at Time 2, r(159) = .538, p <
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.001, but not with the difference between Time 1 and Time 2, r(159) = .091, p > .1 (see
Table 6).
These correlations again provided the basis for exploring Fairness and Social
Justice scores in accounting for differences in mean moral acceptability ratings of
scenarios.
ii.

Hierarchical Linear Model

A hierarchical linear model was used to analyze a data structure where time points
(level-1) were nested within participants (level-2) randomly assigned to conditions. The
dependent variable was participants’ mean moral acceptability ratings of eight scenarios
(either Fair but Unjust or Just but Unfair). Model testing involved five steps that
successively added more predictors, all with intercepts- and slopes-as-outcomes as
variance existed at both levels; error variance from the individual scenarios was fixed
using 1 – reliability (Cronbach’s α) multiplied by the variance of the set of scenarios at
each time points. The final model included time, condition, Fairness scale score, Social
Justice scale score, and their interactions as factors predicting mean moral acceptability
ratings of scenarios. Scenario type, however, was randomly assigned and because there is
no shared variance between participants assigned to either Fair but Unjust or Just but
Unfair scenarios, this particular design does not allow for hierarchical linear modeling
analysis comparing responses to one set of scenarios vs. the other.
For Fair but Unjust scenarios, the regression coefficient representing the main
effect of time was significant and negative as hypothesized (b = -1.96, p < .001, see
Figure 11) indicating that mean moral acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios
decreased significantly across conditions from Time 1 to Time 2 (Time 1 M = 5.54, SD =
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.90; Time 2 M = 3.85, SD = 1.49). Second, there were no significant main effects of
condition (see Figure 12), counter to the second hypothesis. Third, individual differences
as measured by the Fairness and Social Justice scales proved influential at different time
points, indicating a scale by time interaction. The regression coefficient representing the
effect of an individual preference for Fairness was positive and significant at Time 1 (b =
.30, p = .012,see Figure 13) suggesting that higher scores on the Fairness scale predicted
higher mean moral acceptability ratings of Fair but Unjust scenarios only at Time 1. The
regression coefficient representing the effect of an individual preference for Social
Justice was negative and significant only at Time 2 (b = -.65, p < .001, see Figure 14)
suggesting that higher scores on the Social Justice scale predicted lower mean moral
acceptability ratings only when the injustice was made apparent. Last, the hypothesized
scale by time by condition interaction was not supported. See Table 7 for regression
coefficients.
For Just but Unfair scenarios, the regression coefficient representing the main
effect of time was significant and negative as hypothesized (b = -2.04, p < .001, see
Figure 15) indicating that mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios
decreased significantly across conditions from Time 1 to Time 2 (Time 1 M = 5.82, SD =
1.01; Time 2 M = 3.85, SD = 1.42, see Figure 16). Second, an individual difference as
measured by the Social Justice scale proved influential at different time points, indicating
a scale by time interaction. The regression coefficient representing the effect of an
individual preference for social justice was positive and significant at Time 1 (b = .24, p
< .001,see Figure 17) suggesting that higher scores on the Social Justice scale predicted
higher mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios before the unfairness
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is made apparent. In addition, the regression coefficient representing the effect of an
individual preference for fairness was negative and significant at Time 2 (b = -.36, p =
.030, see Figure 18) suggesting that higher scores on the Fairness scale predicted lower
mean moral acceptability ratings of Just but Unfair scenarios when the unfairness was
made apparent. Last, there is a scale by time by condition interaction whereby
participants with a high preference for social justice who were in both the group prime (b
= .28, p = .004) and the individual prime (b = .35, p < .001) conditions rated the Just but
Unfair scenarios at Time 1 as more acceptable than participants in the control condition
(see Figure 19). See Table 8 for regression coefficients.
C. Discussion of Study 2
First, the hypothesized effect of time on mean moral acceptability ratings was
again borne out for both sets of scenarios such that illumination of the conflict between
the two values represented in each scenario at Time 2 resulted in lower moral
acceptability across conditions as compared to Time 1. The effect size for this was found
to exceed convention for a medium effect (η2 = .5), η2 = .65 for Fair but Unjust scenarios,
and η2 = .70 for Just but Unfair scenarios. Essentially, the negative consequences of
upholding one (but violating the other) moral value between fairness and social justice
were evaluated as less morally acceptable, regardless of primed conditions and individual
differences in political ideology, identical to the results of Study 1.
Second, there was no effect of prime condition on the mean moral acceptability
ratings of scenarios at either of the two time points. Third, however, individual
differences in endorsement of fairness and social justice again accounted for a significant
amount of variance in the mean moral acceptability ratings of scenarios in a scale by time
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interaction. The higher the participants were on the Fairness scale, the more morally
acceptable they rated Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1, and the higher the participants
were on the Social Justice scale, the more morally acceptable they rated Just but Unfair
scenarios at Time 1. Moreover, at Time 2 when the conflict was made apparent,
evaluation of the scenarios was again consistent with individual differences, as Fair but
Unjust scenarios at Time 2 (when the injustice was made apparent) were rated as less
morally acceptable as participants’ endorsement of social justice increased, and Just but
Unfair scenarios at Time 2 (when the unfairness was made apparent) were rated as less
morally acceptable as participants’ endorsement of fairness increased.
The individual difference in endorsement of social justice also affected
acceptability ratings of the scenarios when interacting with both priming tasks. The
significant interaction effect between scores on the Social Justice scale and both prime
conditions on Just but Unfair scenarios at Time 1 may be the result of a failure of the
priming task chosen; writing about how one is either different from or similar to close
friends and family are both exercises in thinking about others and relationships, which
may broadly have emphasized participants’ endorsement of social justice rather than
fairness. Why might the individual and collective primes not have been effective in their
own right? Although the Similarities and Differences from Family and Friends task
(Trafimow, et al., 1991) has proven successful at priming an individual or collective
identity, it may be that fairness and social justice have more to do with an individual or
group/social category identity than an ambiguous collective identity. Perhaps if a
group/social category identity is made salient over an individual identity, social justice
would become more relevant and vice versa.
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However, once again, the majority of participants did not recognize the negative
consequences of upholding fairness and violating social justice, or vice versa, at Time 1,
but were largely averse to them when they were made apparent at Time 2. Although an
individual identity prime and a collective identity prime did not strongly and uniformly
affect participants’ ratings of scenarios representing conflicting values, participants’
individual endorsement of each value separately did affect these ratings. Study 2, then,
provides further support for conceptualizing fairness and social justice as separate
influential moral values.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
A. General Discussion
Studies 1 and 2 both provide evidence to bolster the conceptualization of social
justice as a moral value that is separate from, but comparable to, fairness. In Study 1,
priming principles of social justice sensitized participants to social justice concerns
implicit in descriptions of Fair but Unjust scenarios before they were made explicit.
However, rather than priming task, participants’ individual endorsement of fairness and
social justice was most predictive of evaluations of both scenarios. High endorsement of
fairness predicted increased moral acceptability of fair but unjust scenarios, both when
they were first presented and even when the negative consequences to groups in society
(social justice) were made apparent. High endorsement of social justice predicted
increased moral acceptability of just but unfair scenarios at Time 1. The only objections
to the scenarios in terms of individual differences came at Time 2, when the
consequences were made apparent, and higher endorsement of the conflicting principle
predicted decreased ratings of the scenarios. Importantly, social justice and fairness were
not correlated, nor did they differ by condition, supporting the idea that the two are stable
and orthogonal individual differences that are differentially made salient by context (i.e.
scenario).
In Study 2, priming an “individual” or a “collective” identity did not consistently
influence moral acceptability ratings of conflicting scenarios. Nevertheless, the
ineffectiveness of the “collective” prime may help clarify the concept of social justice as
a distribution rule that requires the acknowledgement of social categories and not simply
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collections of people in a group. In fact, across scenarios and conditions, participants’
endorsement of fairness and social justice were most predictive of evaluations of
scenarios: as participants’ endorsement of social justice increased, scenarios were rated as
less morally acceptable if they upheld fairness and violated social justice and rated as
more morally acceptable if they upheld social justice and violated fairness – and vice
versa for participants high on fairness.
Although we had hypothesized condition by time and scale by time interactions
similar to the results in both studies, the time point that elicited a reaction was not Time
1, but Time 2 – when the violations of each principle were made apparent. Essentially,
across both studies, although individual preferences for fairness and social justice as
values increased the moral acceptability of value-consistent scenarios, participants did
not seem to recognize the value conflicts inherent in the scenarios until the (conflicting)
consequences were made explicit, at which point acceptability significantly decreased.
Interestingly, participants displayed a slight inoculation to even these negative
consequences if their strong individual preference for fairness or social justice continued
to be upheld in the scenario.
Nevertheless, our first hypothesized main effect of time was borne out across
scenarios and conditions such that moral acceptability decreased significantly when the
violation of the opposing principle was made apparent. The consistent drop in moral
acceptability of the scenarios from Time 1 to Time 2 may involve the observation that at
Time 2, some harm introduced into a scenario that, at Time 1, involved no harm.
However, the harm that is explicit at Time 2 is nevertheless implicit at Time 1 and visible
to participants who may be motivated to recognize it, although this may involve too much
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effortful processing. Furthermore, priming principles of social justice did decrease moral
acceptability of fair but unjust scenarios at Time 1 in study 1, suggesting that at least
some participants were sensitized to the implicit harm through this manipulation.
Overall, there was still little recognition of the negative consequences of upholding
one moral value and violating the other until the violation was made explicit. Some
factors, however, made this recognition more likely. Specifically, strong individual
preferences for one or the other value, priming social justice principles, and priming a
group identity all had varying effects on moral acceptability ratings of scenarios, but all
participants demonstrated the belief that in scenarios where fairness and social justice
conflict, the consequences of violating one and upholding the other are markedly less
morally acceptable.
B. Limitations & Future Directions
Three methodological changes might be considered to improve upon the
limitations of the described studies. First, Fair but Unjust scenarios at Time 1 had the
lowest internal reliability of all of the sets of scenarios. Perhaps generating more
scenarios and expanding the variety of contexts might give more insight into how the
scenarios differ in quality. In addition to expanding the scenarios, both study designs
were limited in their inability to compare across sets of scenarios (that is, between Fair
but Unjust and Just but Unfair scenarios), which may have yielded more information
about how the two types of dilemmas are qualitatively different from each other. Second,
Study 2 attempted to prime a “collective” identity that may not be as relevant to social
justice and fairness as a “group” identity in the form of social categories. Making these
salient or not in a revised study might be more effective at encouraging participants to
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use a social justice or fairness lens. Third, both studies made use of a sample recruited
online through Amazon Mechanical Turk; although participants reported variance in
demographics, some responses may be unique to this sample, such as socioeconomic
status as revealed by access to a computer.
Also, in both studies, social justice demonstrated an effect either as an individual
difference or as a prime as compared to the control conditions – but not fairness. Might
this lack of difference suggest that fairness is the normal “default” lens and using a social
justice lens requires different or motivated cognition? A test might, for example, involve
participants who express a high preference for social justice who then evaluate similar
conflicting scenarios either under cognitive load or with time and capacity to consider
their reasoning. A decreased preference for social justice when under cognitive load
might lend support to the idea of a fairness perspective being the “default” lens with
which we morally evaluate the allocation of resources.
Last, a consistent main effect of time in both studies demonstrates that
participants were largely approving of scenarios in which negative consequences based
on the violation of fairness or social justice were implicit – until these consequences were
made apparent at Time 2 and moral acceptability ratings decreased significantly.
Although some individual differences increased moral acceptability at Time 1, no
individual differences consistently decreased moral acceptability at Time 1. Besides
overtly displaying principles of social justice, what factors will encourage sensitivity to
the negative consequences of upholding one moral value while violating the other
without overt explanation? Is it that such recognition is too effortful? Must we be
motivated by some internal force or external direction to recognize them in spite of
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requiring this effort? Or is the simple lack of information about the possible
consequences to individuals or groups in society the major barrier to recognition? Further
study is warranted.
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Table 1: Correlations between FUJ outcomes and individual differences

Table 2: Correlations between JUF outcomes and individual difference
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Table 3: Final Estimation of HLM Fixed Effects Fair but Unjust Scenarios Study 1
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Table 4: Final Estimation of HLM Fixed Effects Just but Unfair Scenarios Study 1
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Table 5: Correlations between FUJ outcomes and individual differences (Study 2)

Table 6: Correlations between JUF outcomes and individual difference (Study 2)
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Table 7: Final Estimation of HLM Fixed Effects Fair but Unjust Scenarios Study 2
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Table 8: Final Estimation of HLM Fixed Effects Just but Unfair Scenarios Study 2
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Figure 1: Main effect of time FUJ scenarios Study 1

Figure 2: Main effect of condition FUJ scenarios Study 1
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Figure 3: Main effect of Fairness Scale on Time 1 FUJ Scenarios Study 1

Figure 4: Main effect of Fairness Scale on Time 2 FUJ Scenarios Study 1
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Figure 5: Main effect of Social Justice Scale on Time 2 FUJ Scenarios Study 1

Figure 6: Interaction of Social Justice Prime by Fairness Scale FUJ Scenarios Study 1
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Figure 7: Main effect of time JUF scenarios Study 1

Figure 8: Main effect of condition JUF scenarios Study 1
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Figure 9: Main effect of Social Justice scale on Time1 JUF scenarios Study 1

Figure 10: Interaction of Social Justice Prime by Fairness Scale JUF Scenarios Study 1
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Figure 11: Main effect of time FUJ scenarios Study 2

Figure 12: Main effect of condition FUJ scenarios Study 2
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Figure 13: Main effect of Fairness scale on Time 1 FUJ scenarios Study 2

Figure 14: Main effect of Social Justice scale on Time 2 FUJ scenarios Study 2
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Figure 15: Main effect of time JUF scenarios Study 2

Figure 16: Main effect of condition JUF scenarios Study 2
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Figure 17: Main effect of Social Justice scale on Time 1 JUF scenarios Study 2

Figure 18: Interaction of Prime Conditions & Social Justice scale JUF scenarios Study 2
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Figure 19: Main effect of Fairness scale on Time 2 JUF scenarios Study 2
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APPENDIX A
SCENARIOS

1) Time 1: In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal of money to their
children’s public school.
Time 2: In a city neighborhood, parents donate a great deal of money to their
children’s public school. Other public schools in the city with lower income
families get no additional funds from parents.
2) Time 1: The U.S. has a volunteer army, and individuals are free to enlist.
Time 2: The U.S. has a volunteer army, and individuals are free to enlist.
Volunteers in the U.S. army overwhelmingly come from low income families and
have few job opportunities.
3) Time 1: Students at a respected college are admitted solely on the basis of their
academic merit - a combination of students’ grade point average and their SAT
scores.
Time 2: Students at a respected college are admitted solely on the basis of their
academic merit - a combination of students’ grade point average and their SAT
scores. Students who were not afforded the opportunity to have a high-quality
education are very unlikely to be admitted.
4) Time 1: A popular company provides experience to students through valuable,
unpaid summer internships.
Time 2: A popular company provides experience to students through valuable,
unpaid summer internships. Students who must earn money over the summer are
not at liberty to accept unpaid internships.
5) Time 1: A public school encourages students to join others in field learning
outside of the classroom for a travel fee.
Time 2: A public school encourages students to join others in field learning
outside of the classroom for a small travel fee. Students from low-income families
are not able to pay the fee and, thus, are left behind.
6) Time 1: A university offers admission into an exclusive honors program, with
smaller classes and greater networking opportunities, which results in increased
tuition levels.
Time 2: A university offers admission into an exclusive honors program, with
smaller classes and greater networking opportunities, which results in increased
tuition levels. Students from low-income families are not able to take advantage
of these opportunities, regardless of how quailed they may be.
7) Time 1: A state requires all voters to show government-issued identification
before casting their vote at state elections
Time 2: A state requires all voters to show government-issued identification
before casting their vote at state elections. Poorer residents of the state cannot
afford the identification fee or the travel to procure one.
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8) Time 1: On some crowded highways in the U.S., people can pay to be allowed to
drive on a reserved lane that has less traffic.
Time 2: On some crowded highways in the U.S., people can pay to be allowed to
drive on a reserved lane that has less traffic. People who cannot afford the extra
toll do not have access to the faster lanes.
Scenarios: Just but Unfair

1) Time 1: A very successful state-funded program has been established for special
needs children who are also from underserved communities.
Time 2: A very successful state-funded program has been established for special
needs children who are also from underserved communities. Some parents with
special needs children want to send their children to the successful program, but
cannot because they are not from an under-served community.
2) Time 1: Top colleges are engaging in major recruitment efforts at low income
high schools to increase interest and applications from these students.
Time 2: Top colleges are engaging in major recruitment efforts at low income
high schools to increase interest and applications from these students. Students at
private high schools are now receiving less attention from top colleges.
3) Time 1: Students at a major university are admitted based on a combination of
factors, including, in particular, past hardship, and group membership.
Time 2: Students at a major university are admitted based on a combination of
factors, including, in particular, past hardship, and group membership. Some
students with better academic records are not admitted to the university.
4) Time 1: Several major universities provide need-based financial aid for students
from families living below the poverty line.
Time 2: Several major universities provide need-based financial aid for students
from families living below the poverty line. Students from families living even
slightly above the poverty line still cannot afford tuition and are not offered the
same aid.
5) Time 1: In a new urban housing development, rent does not increase for its lowincome tenants when the market for real estate changes.
Time 2: In a new urban housing development, rent does not increase for its lowincome tenants when the market for real estate changes. The rest of the city’s
tenants must pay increased rent as market prices for real estate increase.
6) Time 1: Currently in the US, health care is provided to everyone and the
government pays for those who cannot afford it.
Time 2: Currently in the US, health care is provided to everyone and the
government pays for those who cannot afford it. The funds for this program come
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from tax payers’ contributions and healthcare is provided even to those who do
not take good care of their health.
7) Time 1: A highly valued job training program is offered to people from typically
underserved areas of the city.
Time 2: A highly valued job training program is offered to people from typically
underserved areas of the city. People who may benefit from the program, but do
not reside in those underserved areas, are not able to participate.
8) Time 1: A major company in an urban area works hard to hire employees that
reflect the makeup of the city’s population.
Time 2: A major company in an urban area works hard to hire employees that
reflect the makeup of the city’s population. There are therefore highly qualified
applicants to the company who are not selected.
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APPENDIX B
SCRAMBLE PRIMES
Scrambled Sentences: Social Justice (Study 1)

The healthier the society, the greater [equality economic the].
A decent society tries to [the minimize income] between those at the very top and the
very bottom.
In the end, large inequalities are [society to harmful].
Wealthy nations have a special responsibility [to poverty eliminate].
Scrambled Sentences: Filler Items (Study 1)

National parks contain many of our [treasured most landscapes].
Mount McKinley, the [highest in mountain] the US, has been renamed Denali.
Scrambled Sentences: Fairness (Study 1)

The [work harder people], the greater the outcome they should receive.
If two people work on a project and [contributes one more] than the other, that person
should receive a greater reward.
Promotion decisions ought to take into account the [effort put workers] into their jobs.
In organizations people who do their jobs well [ought rise to] to the top.
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APPENDIX C
FAIRNESS SCALE
Fairness Scale (Revised Preference for Merit Principle Scale)

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each o the following
statements by circling the appropriate number on the scale below. Items are to be rated
on a seven-point scale with the following anchors: (1) strongly disagree (2) moderately
disagree (3) slightly disagree (4) neither agree nor disagree (5) slightly agree (6)
moderately agree and (7) strongly agree.
1. In society, people who do a good job ought to rise to the top.
2. The effort a person puts into something ought to be reflected in the size of the reward
he or she receives.
3. Members of a team ought to receive different rewards depending on the amount each
person contributed.
4. Between two equally smart people, the one who is the harder worker ought to always
be rewarded more.
5. If every person in a group has the same abilities, rewards ought to be given to the
person who puts in the most effort.
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APPENDIX D
SOCIAL JUSTICE SCALE
Social Justice Scale

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each o the following
statements by circling the appropriate number on the scale below. Items are to be rated
on a seven-point scale with the following anchors: (1) strongly disagree (2) moderately
disagree (3) slightly disagree (4) neither agree nor disagree (5) slightly agree (6)
moderately agree and (7) strongly agree.
1. It is our responsibility, not just a matter of personal preference, to provide for
groups worse off in society.
2. It is important for those who are better off to help provide resources for the most
vulnerable members of society.
3. In the healthiest societies, those at the top should feel responsible for improving
the well-being of those at the bottom.
4. Increased economic equality is ultimately beneficial to everyone in society.
5. Helping those at the bottom of society will not discourage them from working
harder.
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APPENDIX E
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY

Religion
1. To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = not at all religious, 7 = very religious)
2. How important a role does religion play in your life?
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = not at all important, 7 = very important)

Politics
1. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = strong democrat, 7 = strong republican)
2. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
(Scale from 1 to 7; 1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative)
Ethnicity
White – Black – Hispanic/Latino/a – Asian/Pacific Islander –
American Indian/Alaskan Native – Multiethnic – Other
Age
Open-ended response
Gender
Male – Female – Prefer not to disclose
Father’s highest level of education
Did not complete high school – High school degree/GED – Some college –
Bachelor’s degree – Master’s degree – Advanced graduate work – Not sure
Mother’s highest level of education
Did not complete high school – High school degree/GED – Some college –
Bachelor’s degree – Master’s degree – Advanced graduate work – Not sure
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